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This paper presents a critical appraisal of financial crisis theories and their ability to 
illuminate the present crisis in Greece. The paper suggests that financial crises are 
differentiated because of global financial integration of economies that are different 
due to international economic specialisation and division of labour, giving rise to 
different debt structures in different countries. The policy response of governments 
has been one of institutional inertia and refinancing of banks through multilateral and 
state channels. This effectively makes banking crisis into a crisis of the state. The 
relevant theory becomes the Luxemburgist political economy of the state as refinancer 
of last resort, at the expense of the non-financial (real) economy. 
 
 
1. Introduction: The failure of economic theory 
 
The financial crisis that is spreading out from countries with the most ‘advanced’ 
financial systems to the rest of the world has not been well served by economic theory. 
That is to say, economic theories did not, as they should, prepare policy-makers and 
practitioners for the crisis and few theorists have been able to illuminate the course of 
the crisis and its implications with anything other than the insights that had 
conspicuously failed to prepare us for such a crisis. 
 
In the mainstream, New Classical economics has modelled a very attenuated financial 
system, driven by ‘rational’ individuals exchanging real resources to obtain such 
allocations in general equilibrium that maximize utility functions now and over time. 
Disturbances arise because of unanticipated ‘shocks’, following which general 
equilibrium is resumed. This unworldly philosophy ignores the very apparent macro-
economic imbalances that built up over many years (and therefore can hardly be 
described as ‘unanticipated shocks’) and which are now working themselves in the 
deflation of economies. However, the New Classical approach still plays a very real 
part in the thinking of key advisers to policy-makers. Their general equilibrium 
models still reassure us that what is clearly emerging as a lengthy deflationary process 
is a temporary response to the shock of bank defaults, and that stable growth will be 
shortly resumed (Bank of England 2008). 
 
The New Keynesians have also been intellectually hamstrung by a methodological 
addiction to general equilibrium. This was used to model under-employment 
equilibria due to market ‘rigidities’. The more dynamic ‘financial accelerator’ model 
has a credit cycle driven by fluctuations in net wealth. However, this is still within a 
general equilibrium framework and with little explanation of the financial mechanics 
that have now broken down. Such mechanics are replaced by arbitrary constraints and 
lags imposed on the general equilibrium model, in order to generate a cycle (Bernanke 
and Gertler 1989). Among behavioural economists Robert Shiller stands out for his 
embrace of what he regards as more realistic financial economics that rejects ‘realism’, 
i.e., the notion that monetary and financial relations are a mere veil over real 
economic relations.  
 
Outside the mainstream, Post-Keynesians have traditionally emphasized low growth 
and high unemployment as consequences of the departure from ‘Keynesian policies’, 
which range from cheap money to fiscal activism (Coddington 1983, Tily 2007, Chick  
1973, chapter 8). For Post-Keynesians, almost without exception, instability arises out 
of some combination of speculation and financial deregulation (e.g., Kregel 2008, 
Wray 2008). Over the years since Post-Keynesianism emerged in the 1970s, its 
partisans have had one major methodological advantage over New Classical and New 
Keynesian economists, namely the Post-Keynesians’ rejection of general equilibrium. 
This advantage is now apparent but that was of precious little benefit to Post-
Keynesians in the mean-time and led to their being cast out of the mainstream. The 
rejection of general equilibrium inspired Post-Keynesians to embrace an approach to 
financial market dynamics that may be described as ‘market process’. Within this 
Post-Keynesians have emphasised the generation of economic disequilibrium because 
of uncertainty, perverse or fluctuating expectations, highlighting in particular the role 
of speculation in financial markets as a factor in capitalist instability.  
 
Outside the mainstream have also been old Keynesians critics of financial markets, 
such as Charles P. Kindleberger and John Kenneth Galbraith. Their economic 
historical approach to their subject, rejection of the scientific pretensions of modern 
quantitative finance theory, and doom-laden forecasts as the markets rose, caused 
their ideas to be marginalised in their senior stratum of their profession.  
 
The present crisis has not dealt kindly with any of these schools of thought. The 
principal flaws have not been either a devotion to the efficiency of financial markets, 
or a belief in the inefficiency of those markets, since the former were, superficially at 
least, right through the long financial boom, and the latter are quite clearly right in the 
current crisis.  
 
Perhaps the greatest casualties have been suffered by New Classical ideas. The 
attenuated view of financial markets put forward by their most mathematically 
sophisticated exponents such as Michael Woodford has left them with little in the way 
of diagnostic equipment to bring to the analysis of the crisis. The equilibrium business 
cycle idea that real economies are briefly disturbed by ‘shocks’ is clearly inconsistent 
with not only the long-term structural disequilibria, most notably the macroeconomic 
imbalances of the United States, that preceded the crisis, but also the deflation now 
unfolding in the world economy. 
 
The New Keynesian approach, focusing on information asymmetries, is also 
unsuitable for dealing with long-term imbalances. At best it produced a financial 
cycle based on ad hoc lags and restrictions. For all of their claimed insight into credit 
market operations New Keynesians offer little in the way of a theory of credit or 
liquidity, other than a balance sheet of net wealth, that is supposed to respond to 
changing financial conditions by inflating or deflating the economy. However, in a 
credit economy, it is not obvious that ‘agents’ may increase their ‘net wealth’ without 
an increase too of some other ‘agents’’, or the government’s liabilities. The key 
contribution of New Keynesians to financial instability theory is the ‘financial 
accelerator’ model. Like Real Business Cycle theory, the Bernanke-Gertler model 
relies on ‘shocks’ to a system of general equilibrium. Bernanke and Gertler then 
introduce various ‘asymmetric information’ conditions to prolong the adjustment to 
the new equilibrium. In the course of these adjustments the value of borrowers’ assets 
changes and these affect the quality of credit (Bernanke and Gertler 1989).  This is 
inadequate because it is apparent that behind the present crisis are a series of 
structural imbalances, rather than shocks. For example, the fiscal deficits of the 
United States (or Greece) stretch back for  nearly a decade, and the accumulation of 
foreign currency reserves by, say, China, has been going on for two decades if not 
more. 
 
Apart from a confusion about the debt deflation theory of Irving Fisher (in which debt 
deflation is alleged to be caused by ‘an unanticipated fall in the price level’) the 
financial accelerator model suffers from the key defect of lacking a theory of the firm. 
The Bernanke-Gertler model merely divides individual agents into ‘investors’ and 
‘entrepreneurs’, with the latter borrowing from the former. Not only is this patently 
inadequate for understanding the very specific problems of household indebtedness 
that set off the present financial crisis. It also means that the balance sheets of non-
financial firms, that have been the key transmission mechanism whereby a banking 
crisis has become a macroeconomic crisis, do not appear in the model except 
obscured behind a veil of ‘principal-agent problems’. 
 
Much the same is true of the New Keynesians’ cousins in the behavioural finance 
school. Their clear focus on the limitations of individual ‘agents’ understanding and 
rationality, also obscures the balance sheet operations by which modern firms make 
their adjustments to business conditions. (The behavioural finance school also has the 
disadvantage of being led by someone whose touching faith in the ability of futures 
markets to secure us against all economic disasters, is dramatically out of tune with 
what we now know about the risk-reducing efficiency of financial derivatives [Shiller 
1993]). 
 
The ‘Old Keynesians’ of Kindleberger and Galbraith seem to be amply vindicated by 
the events of the crisis. Their accounts of greed, enrichment through financial 
manipulations, the hubris of finance leading to the nemesis of depression, cannot be 
read without evoking vivid parallels with our times. Nevertheless, their insights, 
however profound, do not add up to a systematic analysis, in the sense of laying out 
the market mechanisms by which financial markets are inflated and then deflated. In 
the final analysis, attributing financial boom and collapse to some nebulous 
‘confidence’, or ‘euphoria’ followed by a ‘loss of confidence’, or ‘panic’ reduces 
experience to perceptions of that experience, rather than explaining events. (c.f. 
‘Bagehot’s Lombard Street is the psychology of finance, not the theory of it.’ Keynes 
1915).  
 
Related considerations apply to Post-Keynesian accounts of the crisis, attributing it to 
either speculation or deregulation. The Post-Keynesian view, as indicated above, is 
firmly rooted in the market process in the financial markets. However, it provides for 
weak accounts of business cycles. In the version put forward by Keynes and Kaldor, 
speculation and volatile expectations are permanent conditions of financial markets 
(Keynes 1936, chapter 12, Kaldor 1939). They may provide an explanation of 
economic or financial instability, in the sense of something approaching stochastic 
changes in output and financial variables. But something more is needed to account 
for extended financial booms and collapses. As for deregulation as a factor in the 
financial crisis, it may be a necessary condition of the crisis, but it is not a sufficient 
one. The major dismantling of financial regulations in the U.S. and the U.K. took 
place in the 1970s and the 1990s. By the 1990s it was virtually complete. Yet it took 
another decade and a half for the deregulated edifice to collapse. If anything, this 
would suggest that deregulation provided the economy with a stable boom, rather than 
financial disorder. An additional complication in the Post-Keynesian case, perhaps, is 
that Keynes himself opposed ‘Schachtian’ policies of financial regulation except in 
the international monetary sphere.  
 
The crisis has also provided some vindication for the views of Marxists and 
institutionalist followers of Veblen, whose analyses of capitalism rested to some 
extent at least on the immanence of its failure. We now know much more about the 
financial theories of Marx and Veblen, and can marvel at the sophistication of their 
analysis and even their anticipations of certain aspects of twenty-first century 
financial capitalism. However, most contemporary Marxists still regard twenty-first 
century capitalism as essentially the same as the entrepreneurial capitalism of Marx’s 
time. By contrast, few latter-day institutionalists bother to read the key analysis of 
money and finance that Veblen advanced in his Theory of Business Enterprise, let 
alone extend it to a global credit system. Neither Marxists nor insitutionalists have 
been able to develop any theory of money and finance for modern financial capitalism 
that can provide insights to match or even go beyond those of Keynes, Kalecki, 
Steindl and Minsky. 
 
The laurels for anticipating the crisis must assuredly go to Hyman P. Minsky, the 
leading late twentieth century exponent of the inherent instability of modern financial 
capitalism. In his work, more than in that of any other economist, may be found the 
essential ideas and concepts that are necessary to understand the generation of the 
crisis and its consequences. The flaws in his work arise not because his insights were 
incorrect but because, put together into a systematic analysis, they contain 
inconsistencies in monetary theory (See Toporowski 2008). Central to Minsky’s 
explanation of crisis is the emergence of over-indebtedness in the economy, i.e., 
excessive debt in relation to the income that is supposed to service it. This he drew 
from the debt deflation theory of Irving Fisher (Fisher 1933). However, over-
indebtedness is difficult to reconcile with the boom in equity financing since the 
1980s, and in the years preceding the 1929 Crash. By all accounts equity financing is 
a stabilising feature of financial systems rather than a destabilising one (‘… the 
greater the weight of equity financing in the liability structure, the greater the 
likelihood that the unit is a hedge financing unit.’ Minsky 1992, p. 7). 
 
In general, the financial crisis, like the 1929 Crash and the Great Depression which 
succeeded it, has confounded general equilibrium theorists and justified those critics 
of capitalism who view the system as prone to crisis. But if the crisis reveals the 
credulity of general equilibrium theorists, the catastrophists have an equivalent defect 
in their argument. This is in their failure to explain the relative stability of financial 
capitalism in the decades before the crisis, with only peripheral, if no less catastrophic 
for the markets concerned, crises up to 2007. Monetarists have sought to explain this 
stability and subsequent collapse by attributing it to loose monetary policy before a 
tightening in 2007-2008. This view has two flaws. In the first place, monetary policy 
was hardly loose in the countries now most affected by the crisis, such as the U.K. 
More importantly, monetarists never put forward financial crisis as a possible 
consequence of loose monetary policy. In their view, loose monetary policy was 
supposed to generate inflation in wages and product markets, rather than in the 
financial markets. The absence of such wage and product market inflation prior to the 
crisis is an inconsistency in the monetarist explanation. 
 
 
 
 
2. The Financial Peculiarity of Greece 
 
In analysing financial crises, the most common approach in mainstream economics 
has been to treat financial crises as a stable population of incidents, whose common 
characteristics may be isolated and linked up by estimated parameters which can then 
indicate the likelihood of a crisis (e.g., Reinhart and Rogoff 2010, Barrell et al. 2010). 
This pooling of crises ignores the evolutionary character of the economic and 
financial structures within which crises occur. Pooling makes it impossible to 
distinguish, say, the crisis in the United States, from the emerging market crises of the 
1990s and the early part of this century. Over an extended historical period, by 
excluding historical phenomena such as the emergence of financial markets and the 
rise of the modern capitalist firm, studies such as that of Reinhart and Rogoff (like 
Kindleberger, for that matter) can only analyse crisis in terms of the most common 
human attributes and institutions: folly, money and government. 
 
However, in analysis, and more so in crisis policy, it is necessary to discriminate 
between crises. It is fairly obvious to anyone who has been following the spread of the 
international crisis since 2007 that it differs in different countries. Moreover, in each 
country that has succumbed to crisis, there are common factors, such as financial 
deregulation, but also key differences. The case of Iceland, with credit expansion 
feeding off stock market inflation abroad, for example, is very different to that of the 
United States, with a residential housing bubble. The Greek crisis, as better informed 
observers have noted, differs from the crises of other Southern European members of 
the European Monetary Union, Portugal and Spain, in being a crisis of public sector 
indebtedness, rather than private sector indebtedness. Nevertheless, those countries 
are the geographical space within which a crisis of the Monetary Union has emerged. 
 
The financial crisis that now threatens to engulf the Eurozone, and for which present 
and past Greek Governments are now being blamed, is in fact mostly due to policy 
errors by the leaders of the European Union and the faulty institutional design of the 
Eurozone. In both of these Greek Governments have played only a minor part. Indeed, 
if Greece were not part of the European Union, then the faults would simply emerge 
elsewhere. Even if the European Union were reduced to its northern fringe, say 
Scandinavia, Germany, Austria Benelux and France, then the crisis would break out 
in the Netherlands, where Government indebtedness relative to national income is not 
much below that of Greece (i.e., 99% of GDP in 2009, compared to Greece’s 108%). 
This is because the critical variable is not the absolute level of government 
indebtedness, or even the level of that indebtedness relative to national income, as put 
forward in the Maastricht Treaty, but the level of indebtedness that central banks 
refuse to refinance. 
 
The principle that central banks should not refinance government borrowing gave rise 
to the paradoxical operating framework of central banks in the European Union in 
which central banks may buy in corporate and other bonds, even the collateralised 
debt obligations made infamous in the U.S. financial crisis, but not bonds issued by 
governments. 
 
It is this aspect of central bank operations that has given rise to fears of default on 
their debts by governments. In fact, given that their borrowing is in their domestic 
currency, the danger of default is easily removed by allowing governments to 
refinance their debts, in the same way that companies refinance theirs. Many central 
banks, such as the Bank of England, were originally set up to manage their 
government’s debts, i.e., buying and selling government bonds, to keep a stable 
market in those bonds. This function was finally killed off when the European Central 
Bank was designed at Maastricht in 1992 by central bankers convinced that 
commercial banks and their interbank markets, and capital markets and their credit 
ratings agencies, are better at evaluating financial risks than central banks.  
 
This touching faith in wisdom and foresight of commercial bankers and credit ratings 
agencies has survived despite the mounting evidence (from the emerging market 
crises to the Collateralised Debt Obligations revelations of 2008) that commercial 
bankers and ratings agencies are in fact very poor judges of financial soundness. 
There is a very simple reason for this. The financial success of commercial bankers 
and ratings agencies depends not on their prudence but on their judgement of financial 
market consensus at any one time, however senseless that consensus may be. As 
Keynes wrote, ‘a “sound” banker, alas! is not one who foresees danger and avoids it, 
but one who, when he is ruined, is ruined in a conventional and orthodox way along 
with his fellows, so that no once can really blame him’ (Keynes 1931, p. 176). In the 
wake of the 1929 Crash, Keynes concluded with words even more appropriate today: 
‘The present signs are that the bankers of the world are bent on suicide. At every stage 
they have been unwilling to adopt a sufficiently drastic remedy. And by now matters 
have been allowed to go so far that it has become extraordinarily difficult to find any 
way out.’ (op. cit. p. 178). 
 
The Schachtian principle was just such a senseless consensus. It was partially 
remedied at the beginning of May 2010 when the Eurozone Governments finally 
agreed to set up a €720bn  stabilisation fund for the Eurozone government bond 
markets. This can only be a first step towards a formal system for regulating the 
markets for government securities. 
 
Default is therefore not a problem. A much more serious possibility is that of debt 
deflation. Debt deflation has already started. Businesses and households throughout 
Europe, but especially in Britain and southern Europe, are being squeezed by 
excessive debt. Their response to this is to use income to pay off their excess debt. 
This takes money, nowadays in the form of bank credit, out of normal circulation, 
where it would be spent on goods and services, and instead uses it to pay off debt. In 
the balance sheets of banks, both debits and credits are cancelled by this process, and 
bank balance sheets are reduced. The effect is falling bank credit and reduced 
expenditure in the real economy. Since the best (i.e., most liquid) borrowers pay off 
first, bank borrowing becomes concentrated more and more on worse borrowers, i.e., 
those who cannot pay off their debts. 
 
In this situation, the best that governments can do is supply good quality assets to 
banks, in other words to borrow more from banks, and not less. If governments join in 
the deflation by cutting their expenditure, then the policy becomes self-defeating. 
GDP may then fall faster than the reduction in debt, so that the ratio of government 
debt to GDP continues to rise. Under the current IMF programme, the debt/GDP ratio 
of Greece is expected to rise to 145% by the end of 2011 (still well below that of 
Japan, currently at 192%). However, as a result of fiscal austerity, civil disorder and 
reduced business investment, the gross domestic product of Greece is likely to fall by 
12% by the end of 2011. This would bring the government debt to GDP ratio up to 
155%. In simple terms, it is just not possible to reduce the ratio of debt to GDP by 
cutting expenditure. The only way in which that ratio can be reduced is by economic 
growth: increasing the value (relative to debt) of economic activity. 
 
Apart from the defective principles guiding the establishment of the Monetary Union 
in Europe, the other crucial institutional factor in the crisis is the integration of 
banking and financial markets that has been going on in the Eurozone since capital 
controls were abolished at the beginning of the 1990s (see Toporowski 2009a). 
Although the claims for greater economic efficiency that were made for banking and 
financial integration were always hugely exaggerated, there is no doubt that this 
integration has had the political effect of increasing solidarity with Greece among the 
governments of the European Union. Financial integration now means that banks in 
other countries hold Greek government debt and are prepared to exert pressure to 
ensure that their assets are adequately refinanced.  
 
In the years before financial integration the surpluses that German business obtained 
through its foreign trade were accumulated in German banks. The system of foreign 
capital controls meant that German banks acquired foreign assets through markets 
controlled by the German Government. The trade deficits of countries such as Greece 
effectively drained the foreign currency reserves of the Greek banking system. But 
this too was managed by the government of the deficit country. Such foreign capital 
controls therefore interposed elements of government guarantee for the foreign assets 
of banks.  
 
With financial integration, these government guarantees have been removed. 
Processes of competition in banking markets oblige German, French and Dutch banks 
to acquire as assets the weak debts of southern Europe. Therefore the commercial 
bank deposits of German, French and Dutch businesses and households are backed to 
some degree by the assets that their banks hold in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
For the sake of their banks and the deposits of their businesses and households, the 
Governments of Northern Europe must refinance the debts of Southern Europe. 
 
 
 
3. The Political Economy of Financial Crisis 
 
The common feature of modern financial crises therefore is not the imprudence of 
individuals, bankers, or governments, since crises have affected countries where 
individuals, bankers and governments behaved prudently (e.g., Ireland), while other 
countries with imprudent individuals, bankers and governments have failed to fall into 
crisis (e.g., Poland, Albania). Nor is it the structure of financial crisis the same in all 
countries: In Ireland, for example, the basis of the crisis was a boom and bust in real 
estate; in Iceland it was foreign corporate finance; in Germany it has been the foreign 
exposures of German banks resulting from European financial integration and the 
desire of German banks to maintain leading positions in European banking and 
finance. The common feature that emerged from the beginning of the nineteenth 
century was the intervention of governments to support banks when they fail. This is 
an outcome of the growing importance of banking in an increasingly capitalist 
economy (i.e., an economy in which production requires large-scale finance). As the 
recent crisis has shown, the modern ‘responsible’ government enters banking as a 
‘refinancer of last resort’. This function too had been lost sight of, in recent years as 
bankers came to take for granted seemingly permanent liquidity in the financial 
markets. With liquid money markets, there was no apparent need for central banks to 
operate as lenders of last resort and central bankers removed themselves from the 
money markets, except in the matter of guiding benchmark interest rates, in the belief 
that the money markets are the most efficient at pricing risk.  
 
Following the outbreak of the crisis, the ‘refinancer of last resort’ function has been 
revived, at considerable fiscal cost. Governments were forced to borrow large 
amounts of money, in relation to total GDP. In 2009 and 2010, the net borrowing of 
the Greek Government is estimated at 10.79% of GDP. This is exceeded by the 
British Government’s net borrowing, 11.14% of British GDP, the U.S. Government’s 
net borrowing, 11.73% of American GDP, the Irish Government’s net borrowing, 
11.80%, the Icelandic Government’s net borrowing of 10.89%, and the Spanish 
Government’s net borrowing of 10.92% of GDP. Curiously, fiscal prudence appears 
unrelated to ‘sound’ economic fundamentals: The Icelandic Government was running 
a fiscal surplus of 5.4% of GDP in 2007 thanks, as we now know, to a financial 
bubble that blew out in the following year. (Net borrowing data are from the CIA 
World Factbook and estimates by the International Monetary Fund, reported in the 
London weekly The Observer on the 8 August). Moreover, in cases where the 
Government acquired bank assets (e.g., in Ireland, the U.K., the U.S., and Iceland) the 
value of those assets (and all other assets owned by the government in question) needs 
to be deducted from total government borrowing before arriving at any notional 
‘burden on the taxpayer’. 
 
It is this ‘refinancer of last resort’ function of governments that is the distinguishing 
common feature of all countries affected by the crisis. The revival of that function 
brings with it a political economy of banking that was first put forward by Rosa 
Luxemburg. In her Accumulation of Capital, Rosa Luxemburg argued that banking 
serves to maintain capital accumulation in the advanced capitalist countries with loans 
finance capital exports to developing countries (Luxemburg 1951, chapter xxx.) In her 
analysis, the financial system is international, but based in the advanced capitalist 
countries (as it is today). Governments are weak and, in the poorer countries, are 
dependent upon the international financial system for financing their loans.  
 
Luxemburg was remarkably prescient in recognising that, in poorer countries, the 
socialisation of financial risk, through state guarantees of commercial foreign debts, 
has costs that are unequally distributed between locally-based and foreign-based 
enterprises. The locally-based ones, largely in traditional activities, have virtually no 
possibilities to escape from the tax demands of their government. Foreign-based 
enterprises, usually in the more modern sector of the economy, have huge possibilities 
of escape. Hence, the costs of foreign indebtedness in less developed countries are 
borne by the traditional sector that benefits least from foreign investment. Over the 
longer term, the traditional sector becomes economically marginalised, and the 
traditional state that underwrites the country’s foreign debts becomes politically 
marginalised. In this way the developing world approaches the neo-liberal ideal of a 
small state, whose apparent partiality for business masks an oppressive concentration 
of tax and debt burdens on households and businesses in the traditional sector. The 
economic dynamics of such states are then determined by financial inflows of foreign 
aid, and the pulse of foreign direct investment, punctuated by natural disasters and 
civil disorders (Toporowski 2009b). 
 
The refinancing of banks in difficulty in the advanced capitalist countries has 
reproduced this socialisation of bank risks in the advanced capitalist countries. 
However, the key social, political and economic divide is no longer between a 
traditional and a modern sector of the economy and society, but between different 
classes in society: the capitalists, whose industrial and commercial wealth is being 
reduced by the deflation of the real economy; the middle class, whose consumption 
was sustained through the early years of this century by asset inflation, with the result 
that they are now burdened by excessive debt (that is, debt that the household would 
prefer to pay off before increasing consumption); and the working class that faces 
unemployment at a time when welfare provision for the unemployed is being 
squeezed. The Luxemburgist political economy that has been put to the top of the 
political agenda in Europe is which of these ‘cash-flow-challenged’ classes is to pay 
for what is deemed to be a fiscal crisis of the state, while measures are slowly put into 
place to refinance governments. However, while individuals may pay off their debts, 
as Irving Fisher showed it is a fallacy of composition to believe that an economy as a 
whole, or even a government, can without deflating the economy. The Keynesian 
answer is a hope that fiscal stimulus will generate economic growth. The Japanese 
precedent, from the mid-1990s, is not encouraging.  
 
The challenge for political economy is therefore to go beyond arguments over which 
class will pay (or how much each respective class will pay) towards the control of 
public debt, or how fiscal stimulus may improve matters, beyond even arguments 
about how banks should be organised and run, and onto a discussion of how the 
economy can be socialised. 
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